

But while air power proved successful ultimately, it was of little direct help in stopping the brutality on the ground, particularly in a casualties-allergic age.

The G-8

As regards diplomacy, Kosovo has further shown that, to the surprise of many, the G-8 can be an effective operational, as well as consultative, instrument.

It was thanks to the German Presidency's determination, on the one hand, and the Russian Government's wish, for reasons they have never fully made clear, to use the G-8, and to our lobbying, on the other hand, that this instrument was brought into play.

From the Political Directors' early April draft of the principles for ending the war to the numerous Bonn-Cologne Ministerial negotiations of the UNSC resolution, the G-8 proved indispensable.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

As for the North Atlantic Alliance, born of ideological
conflict and realpolitik, it is profoundly significant that in
its fiftieth anniversary year its first war was waged, not to
repel military attack against its members or for strategic
gain, but in support of human values.

Although not all NATO Allies explicitly justified their
common action in Kosovo in terms of Human Security, the
primary reason for NATO involvement was in fact rooted
in that very concept.

This crisis has validated the significance that Canada
attaches to Human Security in NATO.

It has also confirmed that a commitment to the protection of people also requires a commitment to back diplomacy with the threat of military force and, when necessary, with the use of force.

History looks inevitable in retrospect, but those who live it know otherwise.

NATO proved to be up to the task its members set it, although there were then and remain now doubts that a coalition of democracies is ideally-suited to wage war, particularly in cases where their own national defence is not at stake.

The very precariousness of the Kosovo operation has presumably chastened any allies who might have liked to see NATO as Globocop.

One likely lesson from the experience is that NATO qua NATO will only rarely, if ever, be brought to act in theatres beyond Europe.

The possibility of NATO intervention in East Timor, for example, was not even discussed in the North Atlantic Council.

Developing countries, at once miffed that the Euro-Atlantic world ignores their conflicts/and yet fearful that NATO will come calling/ will likely be able to continue to exploit this contradiction.

Whether the Kosovo experience accelerates the realization
of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI)
remains to be seen but, at the moment, it does seem likely.

If so, Canada will face difficult diplomatic decisions in the
years to come.

MANDATES: Canada and U.N. Security Council

Authorization

In Kosovo, a rescue was within our power, but regrettably not through the U.N.

This brings me to perhaps the most important lessons of the crisis: those pertaining to mandates for humanitarian and peacekeeping operations.

Why did we, Canada, of all countries, act without a U.N. Security Council mandate?

The short answer is that the Security Council had become dysfunctional.

What you might not be aware of is that as President of the Security Council in February, and subsequently, Canada tried several times, in several ways to see whether the Council could be brought to act responsibly.

It became clear, however, in discussions Minister Axworthy had in New York, in Ambassador Fowler's repeated soundings of Council members and in my own discussions with the Russians and others that a resolution to authorize intervention would have been vetoed.

Our consultations also showed that our allies preferred a "connect-the-dots" legal basis for acting, around an apprehended veto, to having to act in defiance of an actual veto.

Had Canada pushed ahead regardless in New York, we might well have ended up destroying NATO unity of purpose and precluding NATO intervention.

Further, we could well have forced Russia into a far more confrontational posture.

Finally, there was little doubt that the international community as a whole did favour such intervention.

This became clear when the Russians tabled a resolution in the Security Council on March 26th calling for an end to NATO action, which was defeated 12-3.

Some have suggested that we should have circumvented the Council and sought a "uniting-for-peace" resolution in the General Assembly.

We did not employ this extremely rarely used manoeuvre because we were similarly not sure that we would have gotten the clear authorization to act that the pressing nature of the crisis required.

Those of you who follow the General Assembly know that it is a highly divided body and that Yugoslavia, as a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement, had and continues to have plenty of chits to call in.

Nonetheless, a lesson the permanent members might draw from NATO action in Kosovo is that their veto power is not as absolute in practice as it seems in theory.

And that they have, as a consequence, every incentive to engage in the search for a solution rather than sit back in the not always well-founded hope that in the end they can veto what they do not like.

Much better, for all concerned, to engage in framing appropriate action.

Once the UN Security Council does decide to act, other problems arise.

There are currently two main obstacles to the issuing of effective peacekeeping mandates in the UN.

The first obstacle is that the United States is not paying what it owes and is demanding that its share of future bills be reduced.

The second obstacle is that the US (alone) insists on a 14-day waiting period for Congress to be consulted before it will approve any peacekeeping operation -- a unilateral restriction which is hardly conducive to enabling the UN to react rapidly, a key Canadian policy goal.

Underlying these positions seems to be a zero-sum-game attitude on the part of American critics of the UN.

Beyond the problems posed by US domestic politics (and perhaps underscoring existing attitudes in Congress), is the persistent view that UN peacekeeping operations are less effective than multinational "coalitions of the willing".

Is this view justified?

THE PATH AHEAD...

Where does this leave us today?

Resolution 1244, which ended the Kosovo war on the conditions that it was ended, implicitly validated the decision of the 16 NATO democracies to by-pass the U.N. Security Council in the first place.

It also, perhaps more importantly, did bring the U.N. back into play.

For the U.N., however, all's not necessarily well that ends well, regrettably.

Today, we face new challenges that could not have been foreseen by those who drafted the U.N. Charter.

Consider that in World War I, five per cent of casualties were civilians: today that figure is closer to 80 per cent.

In this day and age, as Rwanda, Kosovo and Sierra Leone made tragically clear, civilians are direct targets of war, and live on its battlefields.

They have become tools of warfare, herded about to destabilize governments, pressed into military service, held hostage, exploited sexually, and used as human shields.

I personally believe that the U.N.'s future depends on the institution's ability to ensure Human Security.

Together they provide a roadmap for humanitarian protection, for putting people at the heart of international relations.

Canada's main objective on the Council is to make Human Security — particularly the protection of civilians — a central focus of the Council's work.)

~~AA~~ With respect to Sierra Leone, where the next UN peace operation is likely to be carried out, we have been working very hard behind the scenes to ensure that the force has the authority to protect not just itself but civilians, too.

The Secretary General's report on protecting civilians, along with his seminal speech to the General Assembly, have triggered a mega debate on humanitarian intervention and the criteria for judging the advisability of intervening.

History shows that in international conflicts, an ounce of prevention is worth a tonne of cure.

The more we can prevent conflict, the less need there will be, to paraphrase the title of this conference to twist arms and flex muscles.

Another lesson, one that we can be proud of, is that Canada can still put together an exceptionally high quality team.

Our air force went in harm's way, carrying out a full ten per cent (10%) of the strikes against ground targets when some other Allies lacked the military capacity and political nerves to do so.

Our pilots earned us diplomatic negotiating standing, which we made the most of.

Interdepartmental Task Force members in Ottawa and our posts on the "front line" conducted themselves with a professionalism and an indefatigability that did the public and foreign service proud.

It was neither easy nor fun to push one's way into the games the bigger powers prefer to reserve to themselves, but we had to do so and we did.

The foreign service is also stretched thin -- there is no diplomatic immunity from fiscal necessity / and it was neither easy nor fun in effect to run a marathon at sprint pace but we had to do that, too, and we did it.

Minister Axworthy provided the judgement, the political energy and the sense of the moment for Canada to play successfully in the major league of diplomacy.

The Prime Minister and the Defence Minister remained steadfast in helping to maintain Alliance unity and Canadian policy in the face of the criticism of the too-many Canadian pundits who too often seemed more given to posturing than principle and more comfortable with yesterday's nostrums than today's imperatives and tomorrow's possibilities.

The last, but not the least, lesson I draw from the Kosovo conflict is that this time it was the critics who were ready for the last war.